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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of Case: 
The State of Idaho appeals the Opinion and Order entered by District Court Judge Brudie on 
February 19, 2015, wherein the District Judge granted Kyle Rios' pre-trial Motion to Suppress. The 
State of Idaho identifies its appeal is limited to a challenge of the District Court's determination that 
the warrantless evidential)' blood draw was not a consent search. 
2. Statement of Facts: 
In the early morning hours of December 1, 2013, Defendant-Appellee Kyle Rios was 
involved in a motor vehicle collision. (R., p.24.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rios was stopped near the 
scene of the collision and questioned by Officer Elijah Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Officer 
Williams") of the Lewiston Police Department. (R., p.26.) After a brief period of questioning, 
Officer Williams informed Mr. Rios that he was not under arrest, but that Officer Williams was 
detaining him. Officer Williams then placed Mr. Rios into handcuffs and had him sit in the back of 
Officer Williams' patrol vehicle. (Id.) Subsequently, Ofiicer Williams placed Mr. Rios under arrest 
and then transported Mr. Rios to the hospital. (R., p.29.) The purpose for going to the hospital was 
for a blood draw of Mr. Rios' blood. (Id.) There, Officer Williams read the Administrative License 
Suspension advisory form to Mr. Rios and presented him a blood draw consent form. (R. pp.28-29.) 
Mr. Rios refused to sign the form. (R., p.29.) Officer Williams then directed hospital personnel to 
draw Mr. Rios' blood for the evidentiary blood draw. (R., pp.28-29); (SH Tr., p.36, Ls. 16-18.) The 
phlebotomist was already in the Emergency Room preparing to draw blood from Mr. Rios for labs 
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ordered by the attending physician. (Preliminary Tr. p. 58, Ls. 22-24.) The phlebotomist drevv blood 
from the Rios based on the officer's direction to draw Mr. Rios' blood for the evidentiary blood 
draw. (Sh Tr., p.38, L.15 - p.39, L.2; p.48, L.22 - p.4+, L.8.) Officer Williams read Mr. Rios the 
standard consent form for the taking of a blood draw and Mr. Rios did not sign the consent form. 
(R. p.28.) Mr. Rios did not otherwise give consent to the blood drmv. (R. p.29.) Officer Williams 
did not obtain, or attempt to obtain, a warrant for the purposes oflegally directing the phlebotomist 
to blood draw from Mr. Rios. (SH Tr., p.35, Ls. 22-24.) 
3. Course of Proceedings: 
Mr. Rios pied not guilty to the charges filed against him. Subsequent to entering the plea, 
Mr. Rios filed a motion to suppress the evidence from blood test results that were obtained through 
a warrantless evidentiary blood draw for which no exception to the warrant requirement was 
available. After considerable briefing, a hearing on Mr. Rios' motions to suppress vvas held on 
January 6, 2015. After the suppression hearing, the District Judge granted Mr. Rios' motion to 
suppress the blood draw evidence. 
Following the issuance of the District Court's written decision, the State ofldaho filed its 
appeal on February 27,201, and amended it on March 3, 2015. The State's brief in support of appeal 
was filed October 5, 2015. Mr. Rios now submits his brief in response to the State's appeal. 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellee Kyle Rios respectfully restates the issue on appeal as follows: 
Should this Court uphold the district court's order granting Kyle Rios' motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained from a warrantless evidentiary blood draw where there the State failed to carry 
its burden of proof to establish that Mr. Rios' consent to the evidentiary blood draw was actual, 
voluntary consent and not merely a continuation of the implied consent statutorily imputed to him 
under Idaho Code § 18-8002 where Mr. Rios refused to sign the consent to blood draw form, thereby 
vvithdrawing his implied consent, and Officer Williams still directed hospital personnel to draw Mr. 
Rios' blood without a warrant? 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 3 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT TO GRANT KYLE RIOS' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A 
WARRANTLESS EVIDENTIARY BLOOD ORA W BECAUSE MR. RIOS 
DID NOT GIVE ACTUAL, VOLUNTARY CONSENT AND HE 
'WITHDREW IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTORILY IMPUTED TO HIM 
UNDER IDAHO CODE §18-8002. 
A. Introduction 
The evidence at the suppression hearing established that Defendant-Appellee, Kyle Rios, was 
suspected of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Idaho 
Code Section 18-8002. Based upon then the testimony of Officer Elijah Williams and Phlebotomist 
Hannah Espy, the testimonial evidence established that Officer Williams directed Ms. Espy to draw 
Mr. Rios' blood for an evidentiary blood draw despite the fact Mr. Rios refused to sign the required 
consent to blood draw form and despite the fact Officer Williams failed to obtain a search warrant 
thus resulting in a warrantless blood draw. The district court correctly suppressed the evidence 
obtained from the warrantless blood draw. 
Rule l 2(b )(3) of the Idaho Criminal Rules requires the suppression of any evidence that was 
illegally obtained. The foundation for this rule comes from the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. In the case at bar, Defendant-
Appellee Kyle Rios' blood was obtained without a warrant and without a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, and therefore in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. As such, the warrantless blood draw was unconstitutional and the results 
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from the unconstitutional search are required to be suppressed. The district court was correct to 
suppress the results of the warrantless evidentiary blood draw obtained from Mr. Rios. 
Whether justified under the exigent circumstances exception or under the consent exception 
by using Idaho's implied consent statute, a blood draw remains subject to Fourth Amendment 
standards of reasonableness. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 
908 (1966). Under Idaho law, without legal consent, law enforcement officers need either a valid, 
duly executed search warrant or probable cause plus an exception to the warrant requirement such 
as exigent circumstances in order to make lawful and constitutional evidentiary blood draw. In the 
case at bar, Officer Williams did not attempt to obtain a search warrant before directing hospital 
personnel draw Mr. Rios' blood for an evidentiary blood test. Instead he relied on his "normal 
procedure" when he decided to obtain a warrantless blood draw. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.31, Ls. 22-24) 
This fact is uncontested. Therefore, the evidentiary blood draw of Mr. Rios must be found 
unreasonable and unconstitutional unless the State is able to show the existence of probable cause 
and an exception to the warrant requirement. In response to the State's attempt at using exigent 
circumstances and/or consent as relevant and applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement, the 
district court correctly concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to show the that the 
warrantless evidentiary blood draw of Mr. Rios \Vas justified by either exigent circumstances or Mr. 
Rios' actual and voluntary consent. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 5 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, \Ve accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014); State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 
230,232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993,997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 
789,979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Specific to the issues in this case, whether exigent circumstances exist is largely a factual 
one; thus, the review of a district court's finding of exigent circumstances based on specific findings 
of fact is made pursuant to the clearly enoneous standard. United States v. Brock. 667 F.2d 1311 
(9th Cir. 1982). The same is true in response to a consent search and whether consent to a search 
was voluntary is a question of fact, and the standard ofreview requires that an appellate court accept 
a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly enoneous. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 
69 P.3d I 052, I 057 (2003). Findings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supp011ed by 
substantial evidence in the record. State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 155, 983 P.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 
1999). But, vvhen the evidence may be equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court's finding 
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of fact is based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record, it will not be disturbed 
on appeai. State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481,484 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. The Warrantless Evidcntiary Blood Draw \Vas Unreasonable \Vhere The State Did 
Not Meet The Burden Of Proof Necessary To Establish The Consent Of Mr. Rios 
To The \Varrantless Evidentiary Blood Draw As Required To Except Officer 
Williams From Obtaining A Search Warrant Prior To Ordering The Blood Draw. 
The district court's conclusion was correct where, under the totality of the circumstances, it 
found Mr. Rios did not consent to the warrantless evidentiary blood dmw as required to except 
Officer Williams from obtaining a search warrant prior to ordering the evidentiary blood draw 
because the State's evidence vvas insufficient to carry its burden of proof on the issue of consent. 
Specifically, the district court was correct to conclude that Mr. Rios did not give actual, voluntary 
consent to the warrantless blood draw where he refused to sign the consent to blood draw form and 
did not otherwise give his affirmative verbal consent. The district court was also correct to conclude 
that vvhen Mr. Rios refused to sign the consent to blood draw form that affirmative act operated as 
a withdrawal of his implied consent statutorily imputed to him under Idaho Code § 18-8002. In its 
written opinion, the district court specifically outlined how it reached its correct conclusion where 
it determined that based on the evidence presented, the State failed to meet its burden of proof to 
justify the warrantless search of Mr. Rios' blood under a consent exception and therefore, the 
warrantless evidentiary blood draw was executed in violation of Mr. Rios' Fourth Amendment Right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Together, both conclusions are sufficient to show that 
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the district court used a totality of the circumstances analysis when it correctly granted Mr. Rios' 
motion to suppress. As such, the district comi did not err in granting Mr. Rios' motion to suppress 
the results of the warrantless, non-consensual blood draw. 
The exclusionary rule calls for suppression of evidence that is gained through 
unconstitutional governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,815 (1984); State v. 
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005). This prohibition against the use 
of derivative evidence extends to the indirect as well as the direct fruit of the government's 
misconduct. Segura, 468 U.S. at 804; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963). When 
a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal search, the burden 
of proving that a search occurred is on the defendant. State v. Reese. 132 Idaho 652,654,978 P.2d 
2 I 2,214 (1999). When a defendant moves to suppress evidence allegedly gained through 
unconstitutional police conduct such as an illegal search, it is the state who bears the ultimate burden 
of persuasion to prove that the challenged evidence is untainted. Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 183 (1969); Wigginton, 142 Idaho at 184, 125 P.3d at 540; State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 
98, 29 P.3d 406,409 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The Fomih Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
Reasonableness is the key to any Fourth Amendment analysis.See Pennsylvaniav. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 ( 1977). Further, the Fourth Amendment mandates a 
warrant based on probable cause and reviewed by an impartial magistrate as the operational 
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safeguard against arbitrary police intrusions. Id. As such, a search or seizure conducted without the 
aid ofa warrant is per se unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 
2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) ("In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal 
property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is 
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing 
the items to be seized."). Therefore, in the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls 
. within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 
189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 
(2011)). 
Moreover, under both Federal and Idaho law, requiring a person to submit to a blood draw 
for evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418, 337 P.3d at 577. 
Therefore, warrantless forced blood draws are violative of both state and federal constitutions. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1152, 185 L.Ed.2d 908 (2013). Once a search has been found, the 
burden shifts to the State to prove that the search was constitutional. State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 
692,991 P.2d 878,880 (Ct. App. 1999). This was the first burden of proof hurdle the State was 
required to overcome at the hearing on Mr. Rios' motion to suppress evidence. 
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A vvarrantless search is constitutional only if it falls within a specific exception to the v.arrant 
requirement. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014). A defendant's 
consent to search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218,222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In that instance, the state has the 
burden of demonstrating defendant's consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 
Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420,422 (Ct. App. 1997). This is the second burden of proof hurdle the 
State was required to overcome at the hearing on Mr. Rios' motion to suppress evidence. As 
outlined below, and based on the totality of the circumstances, the State failed to overcome both 
burden of proof hurdles required ofit when relying on Mr. Rios' consent to except Officer Williams 
from obtaining a search warrant. As the district court correctly concluded, the State did not carry 
its burdens and suppression of the evidence was required. 
Here, the district court relies on State v. Wulff, I 57 ldaho 416, 8337 P.3d 575 (2014), which 
looked to Missouri v. McNeely, 1 and the United States Supreme Court's subsequent act of vacating 
the judgment in Aviles v. State, 2 as guidance before undertaking its own analysis to determine how, 
1 Wherein the United States Supreme Court held that it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for 
police to rely upon the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream as a per se exigency to justify an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement for non-consensual blood testing. Missouri v. McNeelv, 133 
S.Ct. 1152, 185 L.Ed.2d 908 (2013). 
2 The Supreme Court vacated the Aviles judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of 
McNeely, leaving the Wu(tf Court to state, "Therefore, distinguishing McNeely based on the fact it involved exigent 
circumstances is not viable because vacating and remanding Aviles in light of McNeely showed the United States 
Supreme Court rejected Texas' implied consent statute as a per se exception to the Fourth Amendment." (R., p. 417, 
citing Wulff at 581.) Aviles v. State.443 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App. 2014), petition for discretionary review filed (Aug. 8, 
2014). 
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or if the holding in Missouri v. tvkNeclv was applicable to Idaho· s implied consent statute. as 
authority for its application of a totality of the circumstances analysis of the evidence about consent 
presented at the hearing on Mr. Rios' motion to suppress. As the district court correctly concludes, 
the state of the law in Idaho following Wulff is that implied consent under Idaho's implied consent 
statute can be revoked. (R., p. 417.) And further, if a driver withdraws implied consent and a 
warrantless blood draw is obtained, the correct analysis of whether the blood draw violated the 
constitutional standards of reasonableness required under the Fourth Amendment is a totality of the 
circumstances analysis. (R., p. 418.) Operationally, when the State relies on Idaho's implied consent 
statute as authority for the justification of a warrantless search under the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement, the current state ofidaho law requires the State prove (1) the driver gave his 
or her initial consent voluntarily and (2) the driver continued to give his or her voluntary consent at 
the time of the evidentiary test was requested. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423,337 P.3d at 582. However, 
due misleading nature of the term "implied consent," the two prongs in the Wulff test require a more 
detailed explanation. To further the necessary explanation, Mr. Rios borrows the formative 
explanation of Judge Gutierrez as \Witten in his dissenting opinion in the recent case of Bobeck v. 
Idaho State Transp. Dep't, No. 42682, 2015 WL 5602964, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2015) 
to provide the relevant details. As Judge Gutierrez explains: 
'· ... despite the misleading term "implied consent law," actual consent is still 
required for a warrantless blood draw ... statutorily implied consent [alone] is 
insufficient to satisfy the consent exception to the \Varrant requirement. The 
consent exception requires actual consent. Implied consent may lead to actual 
consent when a driver agrees to submit to an evidentiary test. But without such 
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agreement, there is no consent for performing the test.'' 
Id. 
Therefore, in this case, to prove the consent of Mr. Rios was voluntary, the State must shmv, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that ( l) Mr. Rios gave his initial consent voluntarily and (2) Mr. 
Rios gave actual, voluntary consent to the warrantless blood draw, at the time the evidentiary test was 
requested, and differentiated from a continuance of the implied consent statutorily imputed on him 
by Idaho Code §18-8002 .. 
i. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The State Failed To Carry 
Its Burden To Show Mr. Rios Gave Actual, Voluntary Consent For The 
Warrantless Blood Draw. 
As the district court correctly concluded, Mr. Rios did not consent to the warrantless 
evidentiary blood draw. This is evidenced by the uncontroverted fact that Mr. Rios refused to sign 
the required consent to blood draw fonn and in addition to the evidence present by the State wherein 
both Officer Williams and phlebotomist Hannah Espy testified that Mr. Rios did not verbally 
manifest his consent. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.35, Ls. 20-21). The status of Mr. Rios' consent is to be 
assessed at the time Officer Williams requested Mr. Rios submit to the evidentiary blood draw. As 
the district court correctly concluded, the State did not meet its burden which required the district 
court find Mr. Rios did not voluntarily consent to the warrantless blood drnw. 
Consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,222 (1973); State v. Domirn:mez, 137 Idaho 681,683, 52 
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P.3d 325. 327 (Ct. App. 2002). As such. law enforcement officers may conduct a search ·,vithout a 
warrant or probable cause based upon an individual's consent, so long as that consent is voluntary 
and actual. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1 i26, 1129-30 (2014). The voluntariness of an 
individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 
P.3d 1052, I 057 (2003 ). The State bears the burden to prove consent by a preponderance of the 
evidence. United States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974); Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796, 69 
P.3d at 1057; State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747,749,947 P.2d 420,422 (Ct. App. 1997). Consent, once 
given, may also be revoked, for "[i]nherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right 
of the person to withdraw that consent." State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643,646,339 P.3d 368, 371 
(2014). To that extent, after a defendant has revoked consent, officers may no longer act pursuant 
to that initial voluntary consent. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477,480 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
In the blood draw context, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that warrantless 
searches for the presence of alcohol cannot, as a matter of course, be justified by implied consent. 
See State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773,774,339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 
643, 647, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014). 
Similarly to McNeelv, and in comparison, the Wulff Court's holding was in response to the 
justification commonly used by the State when faced with a challenge to a warrantless evidentiary 
blood draw. This justification was based upon the State's argument that a driver suspected of driving 
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under the influence has consented to an evidentiary test for intoxicants under the implied consent 
statute and the implied consent statute falls \Vithin the purview of consent as an exception to the 
warrant requirement where the statute imputes consent to those drivers who have availed themselves 
to the privilege of driving on Idaho roadway. However, the Wulff holding expressly admonished 
this practice and fount it to be an unconstitutional per se exception to the warrant requirement, in 
direct conflict with the McNeely court's holding. The Wulff holding is clear direction to Idaho law 
enforcement officers that routine reliance upon this unconstitutional per se exception alone, will 
no longer justify a warrantless blood draw. Instead, under Wulff~ whether or not consent can justify 
a wairnntless evidentiary blood draw must no\v be determined on a case by case basis and through 
a totality of the circumstances analysis. 
To the extent a totality of the circumstances analysis is now required, recent case law in Idaho 
provides further guidance. In State v. Halseth, the our Supreme Court clarified that when relying on 
consent as an exception to the warrant requirement, the consent must be voluntary, and whether 
consent is voluntary is to be determined by the totality of circumstances. 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 
P.3d 368,371 (2014). From State v. Haynes, we learn that Idaho's implied consent statute keeps 
the burden on the State by requiring the State prove not only that a driver gave his or her initial 
consent voluntarily but that the State also must prove the driver gave consent to the \Varrantless 
blood draw voluntarily and at the time the evidentiary test is requested. Furthermore, State v. 
Halseth also clarifies that under current Idaho law, a driver's refusal, protest, or objection to 
evidentiary testing terminates the implied consent: 
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·'[ A ]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's does not justify a warrantless blood 
draw from a driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to the blood draw .... 
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to 
withdraw that consent." 
Halseth. 157 Idaho 643,646, 339 P.3d 368,371 (2014). 
From these holdings, it follows that because implied consent is capable of being revoked, a 
driver's actual consent becomes relevant and implied consent is just one of many factors to be 
considered in a totality of the circumstances analysis. Idaho's implied consent law presents a drive 
with choice: a driver may elect to revoke his or her implied consent by refusing an evidentiary test 
and face harsh administrative penalties, or a driver may elect to continue to give his or her voluntary 
consent by taking an evidentiary test and run the risk facing criminal charges for driving under the 
influence if the test if failed. See State v. Havnes, 159 Idaho 36,355 P.3d 1266 (2015) (Jones, W 
., L concurring) (identifying the implied consent law as presentation of choices by the Legislature 
through incentivizing the choice to not withdraw implied consent.) Also, implied consent can lead 
to actual consent when a driver agrees to submit to an evidentiary test, however, absent such 
agreement, there is no consent for performing the test. On the other hand, if implied consent is 
withdrawn, the analysis stops there because the first prong of the Wulff test fails. Justice W. Jones 
was the first to articulate this concept and he did so in his \\Titten concmTence to the majority's 
decision in Idaho Supreme Court case State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36,355 P.3d 1266 (2015). In his 
concurrence, Justice Jones stressed the concept that unless a driver objects or takes steps to withdraw 
implied consent, the driver must still give actual, voluntary consent to a blood draw. Id. In other 
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words, implied consent plus actual, voluntary consent at the time the evidentiary test was requested 
must be established before a court can find that a driver consented to a warrantless search under 
consent used as an exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, as explained by Judge Gutierrez 
in his written dissent to the recently issued Court of Appeals decision in Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. 
Dept., No. 42682, 2015 WL 5602964, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2015), the totality of 
circumstances analysis for determining whether a suspect's consent is voluntary confirms that "one 
circumstance, such as driving on Idaho roads, is insufficient to constitute actual, voluntary consent." 
The logical reasoning gained from the interpretations of both Justice Jones and Judge Guiterrez can 
be sufficiently summed up using the words of Judge Guiterrez himself: 
"If voluntarily driving on the roads was sufficient, the second prong articulated 
in Wu?ff where drivers must continue to give voluntary consent would therefore 
be superfluous, and negate the required totality of circumstances analysis. In 
sum, despite the misleading term 'implied consent law,' actual consent is still 
required for a warrantless blood draw." 
Bobeck at *7 
Under the facts of this case, because a blood test is a search and because Officer Williams 
directed the evidentiary blood draw of Mr. Rios without a warrant, the State bears the burden of 
demonstrating that Mr. Rios validly consented to the test. As the district court correctly concluded, 
the State failed to carry its burden in this case when it did not present sufficient evidence of that Mr. 
Rios gave actual, voluntary consent for the warrantless blood draw. The State argues that it was Mr. 
Rios' burden to prove that he either did not consent to the warrantless evidentiary test or that he 
withdraw his implied consent. By doing so, the State is asking this court to ignore lengthy Idaho 
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precedent about who bears the burden of proof when consent is raised to as an exception to the 
,varrant requirement to justify a warrantless evidentiary blood test This argument is not a new or 
novel argument-it is simply a colorful attempt at rephrasing the already well-settled issue into one 
more favorable to its position. Despite it's contention, the State does not have the prove a negative. 
Rather, the State must prove Mr. Rios' consent was actual, voluntary consent. Furthermore, the 
State offers no authority to support its request that this colorfully rephrased the burden to shift it on 
to a defendant. This court should, instead, refuse the State's attempt to muddy the water, and decline 
to alter the burden of proof standard when it is well settled in Idaho that where reasonableness of a 
wmTantless search is justified through reliance on consent as an exception to the warrant 
requirement, it is the State who must cany the burden to prove the driver gave actual, voluntary 
consent. Or, in other words, when the State relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, as the 
State does in this case, the State has the burden of proving the consent was freely and voluntarily 
given. 
Here, Mr. Rios did not give actual, voluntary consent to the warrantless blood draw where 
evidence he refused to sign the consent form and did not verbally consent was uncontroverted . In 
its argument on appeal, the State contends that the district court's decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record or based upon the totality of the circumstances because the State 
believes the district court relied only on Mr. Rios' refusal to sign a consent form -when reaching its 
conclusion. In reality, however, the district court's decision was required under the circumstances 
at hand where the State failed to carry its burden of proof. The district court properly considered the 
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totality of the circumstances before it when it correctly concluded the State failed to present evidence 
of Mr. Rios' actual, voluntary consented to the warrantless evidentiary blood dmw. In fact, in the 
extensive pre- and post hearing briefing, and at the hearing on Mr. Rios' motions to suppress, it was 
Mr. Rios who presented evidence regarding the issue of consent. The State did not present any direct 
evidence on the issue of consent in any of their briefs or at the suppression hearing. Specifically, the 
State did not present any evidence that Officer Williams obtained Mr. Rios' actual, voluntarily 
consent at the time he requested the evidentiary blood draw. In fact, the testimony of Officer 
Williams suggests the opposite. Officer Williams' testimony evidence showed that he read Mr. Rios 
the ALS advisory form, that Rios did not say anything to Officer Williams or the phlebotomist to 
indicate that consented to the test, and that Mr. Rios was not unruly or resistant towards the 
phlebotomist vvhen she was dravving his blood. However, the testimony of both Officer Williams 
and Hannah Espy concede that Mr. Rios refused to sign the consent form. 
In its written decision, the district court identifies the following testimony evidence it used 
when rendering its correct conclusion: The lack of actual or express consent from Mr. Rios, the 
absence of a search wan-ant, Mr. Rios' cooperation with the phlebotomist and the lack of physical 
resistence from Rios. (R., p.419, Ls 3-8.) While it's true that the district court explicitly states is 
reliance upon Mr. Rios' refusal to sign the consent form vvhen con-ectly concluding that Mr. Rios 
did not consent to the wan-antless blood draw, the district court does not, as the State contends, only 
rely on this one fact when reaching its con-ect conclusion. Instead, the district court found that not 
only did Mr. Rios' refusal to sign the consent form evidenced his non-consent, but it could also be 
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reasonably construed as a \Vithdrmval of Mr. Rios· implied consent. (R., p.419. Ls 8-9), emphasis 
added. Thus, the district comi identified two ways it could reach its outcome that the State did not 
meet its burden of showing Mr. Rios voluntarily consented to the warrantless evidentiary blood draw 
to save the admissibility of the results obtained from the warrantiess search. 
The State argues that the District Court \Vas misplaced in relying upon the holding in State 
v. An-otta. 157 Idaho 773, 339 P.3d 1177 (2014) to determine that Mr. Rios had withdrawn his 
implied consent. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 9.) However, the district court's use of Arrotta was 
simply in reference to the concurrent way it reached its outcome in that by not signing the consent 
form Mr. Rios effectively withdrew his implied consent because in Arrotta it was determined that 
the defendant withdrew his implied consent after a singular act of refusing to perform a breath test. 
157 Idaho at 774, 339 P.3d at 1178. Even if the district court did rely upon the holding in AITotta 
as the State contends, it is not misplaced in that the Arrotta Court affirmed the district court's 
holding that a singular act by a defendant is enough to evidence an effective withdrawal of the 
defendant's statutorily implied consent and here, the district court found that Mr. Rios' refusal to 
sign the consent form could reasonably be construed, under Arrotta, to evidence an effective 
withdrawal of his statutorily implied consent. 
Ultimately, the district court found that not only did Mr. Rios' refusal to sign the consent 
form evidenced his non-consent, but it could also be reasonably construed as a withdrawal of Mr. 
Rios' implied consent. (R., p.419, Ls 8-9), emphasis added. Thus, the district court identified two 
ways it could reach its outcome after the State failed to carry its burden of showing Mr. Rios 
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actuallv and voluntarilv consented to the warrantless evidentiarv blood draw. Moreover. even if the .; ... .,, ; 
this court finds that Mr. Rios did not withhold consent, as the State so contends, Mr. Rios' actual, 
voluntary consent is irrelevant where the district court concluded that his refusal to sign the consent 
fonn operates as a withdrawal of his implied consent. Under the rule announced in Halseth, and 
elaborated in Wulff and Arrotta, this withdrawal was effective and terminated the operation of the 
·'implied consent" imposed by statute. As such, Officer Williams was no longer acting pursuant to 
Mr. Rios' implied consent when he directed hospital personnel to draw Mr. Rios' blood because the 
effect of Mr. Rios' withdrawal was immediate. In light of the fact the State presented no evidence 
of actual, voluntary consent to the blood draw, the warrantless evidentiary blood draw was an 
unreasonable search, and the district court was correct in concluding the evidence from the 
evidentiary blood draw must be suppressed. 
11. The District Court Correctly Rejected the State's Claim That The Only Way To 
Affirmatively Show Non-consent To A Blood Draw Is Through Physical 
Resistance. 
The simple fact of the matter here is that the State proposes this Court create a rule that in 
order to effectively revoke or withdraw ones implied consent, such revocation must be done by 
physical force or otherwise unpeaceful behavior. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 9.) To do so would 
be in direct conflict with controlling authority and would create not only an absurd result, but a 
dangerous one as well. The State contends that Mr. Rios consented to the evidentiary blood draw 
because he did not physically "resist" the phlebotomist and did not need to be restrained. (Plaintiff-
Appellant' s Brief at 8.) The State focuses on Mr. Rios' acquiescence as evidence of his consent. 
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However, as the United States Supreme Court held in Bumper v. North Carolina, ··[m]ere 
acquiescence to a claim of authority by a law enforcement officer does not constitute consent. 
Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). The Bumper 
Court explained further: "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of 
a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given, his 
burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim oflawful authority. 
Id. at 391 U.S. 548-49, 88 S. Ct. 1792. Likewise, in this case, the State seeks to rely upon consent 
to justify the warrantless blood draw and as such, its burden is not discharged by showing no more 
than Mr. Rios' acquiescence to Officer Williams' directive that the phlebotomist draw Mr. Rios' 
blood. 
The State attempts to use the holding in State v. Halseth to support its proposed rule that this 
comi require physical resistance to affirmatively evidence lack of consent in its. However, the State, 
and again through colorful paraphrasing, inaccurately portrays the Halseth Court's holding as having 
created a requirement that a defendant affirmatively reject or physically resist the evidentiary testing. 
(Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 7.) When in fact, the Court in Halseth simply determined that an 
objection to the blood draw or a refusal to consent are enough to evidence implied consent has been 
withdrawn. See State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368 (2014). 
The Defendant in Halseth was stopped and arrested in Washington by a Washington state 
trooper. Halseth. 157 Idaho at 644, 339 P.3d at 369. The trooper asked Defendant to complete 
voluntary field sobriety tests, and Defendant refused. Id. The trooper then transported Defendant to 
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a hospital in Spokane, Washington, to have his blood drav,r1 for e\·identiary testing. Id. Defendant 
protested, stating: "You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you just take it without 
permission'?"Ji:!. Despite his protests, the hospital technician drew blood samples from each of 
Defendant's arms. Id. No search \Van-ant was obtained prior to the blood draws. Id. Due to the 
nature of the case, the State of Idaho charged Defendant Halseth with several crimes including 
driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the 
ground that he did not consent to the warrantless search. In reaching its decision, the Halseth Court 
considered the United States Supreme Court's action in Aviles and its reasoning and statements in 
McNeely, and ultimately held an implied consent statute such as Idaho's does not justify a 
warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent to an evidentiary test, as did Defendant 
[Halseth] and as did the defendant in Aviles, or from a driver who objects to the blood draw, as did 
Defendant [Halseth] in this case. Halseth. 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d at 371. As such, either 
Halseth's refusal in to participate in the breath test or his verbal objection to the blood drmv was 
enough to evidence a lack of actual, voluntary consent. 
Similarly, a refusal to participate in evidentiary testing is not a physical assertion of 
revocation of consent but can nevertheless evidence a lack of actual, voluntary consent. The case of 
State v. Eversole is illustrative. In that case, when Defendant Eversole refused to participate in a 
breath test for alcohol concentration the com1 held that he had thereby withdravm any implied 
consent created by LC. § 18-8002(1 ), and as such, the consent exception to the warrant requirement 
was inapplicable unless the State proved some subsequent action or statement by Eversole renewing 
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his consent. State v. Eversole. No. 41063, 2015 WL 1542545, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015). 
The court went on to clarify that even though the facts did not include information regarding 
Defendant Eversole's reaction to the officer's demand for a blood draw, even if Defendant Eversole 
did not specifically object to the blood draw, the absence of a second objection would be immaterial, 
for by refusing to submit to a breath test Defendant Eversole had already withdrawn the statutorily 
implied consent. Id. 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island saw the reasonable determination that refusal to sign a 
consent form is evidence of a lack of actual, voluntary consent. The Court in State v. Casas called 
into question the voluntariness of Defendant Casas' consent when he refused to sign the consent 
form until he spoke to his lawyer. State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120 (R.I. 2006), It determined that 
when defendant refused to sign the consent-to-search form, the police officer was under an obligation 
to inquire further and to satisfy himself that defendant had not withdrawn his consent. Id. The Casas 
court expanded its holding further when it proposed that when a police officer presents a suspect 
with a consent-to-search form, the officer either is seeking or confirming consent and if the suspect 
refuses to sign the fom1, the officer must inquire further to determine whether the suspect has 
consented or has withdrawn consent. State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120 (2006). Mr. Rios proposes this 
court require the same expansion of inquiry to Idaho law enforcement officers who are faced with 
a refusal to sign a consent form. 
Interestingly, here, the State did concede that Rios did not sign the consent form, but its 
argument on appeal is that the consent form is of no significance to the issue of consent. 
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(Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12.) The State argues that by not signing the consent form, the only 
consequence is that Mr. Rios deprived the state of a specific piece of evidence indicating that he 
'·affirmatively consented" to the evidentiary blood draw. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12) If 
signing the consent form constitutes an affirmative act evidencing consent, then wouldn't the refusal 
to sign the consent form constitute an affirmative act evidencing refusal to consent? The State also 
contends, the only "particular legal significance" of the consent form is evidentiary documentation 
of a defendant's consent. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 11.) Would it not follow that a refrisal to 
sign the consent form is evidentiary documentation of a defendant's revocation of consent? If, 
hypothetically, there were no additional facts, the State's inability to provide a signed consent form 
\Vould be fatal to its burden to show defendant consent was actual and voluntary. 
The district court granted Mr. Rios' motion to suppress by specifically and correctly 
concluding that the warrantless search of Mr. Rios' blood under a consent exception to the warrant 
requirement was in violation of Mr. Rios' Fourth Amendment Right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures because the State failed to meet its well-settled burden of proving consent as an 
exception to the warrant requirement and failed to meet its burden of proof to show Mr. Rios' 
consent to the evidentiary blood draw and was actual, voluntary consent and not just a mere 
continuation of the implied consent statutorily imputed upon Mr. Rios by Idaho Code § 18--8002. As 
the district court correctly found, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing lacked the 
indicia of consent. But, the district court did not merely note that Rios had revoked his implied 
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consent, instead. the district court properly considered the totality of the circumstances before it 
when it concluded Rios did not consent to the evidentiary blood draw. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court was correct to conclude Mr. Rios' Constitutional right against unreasonable 
search and seizures was violated when Officer Williams ordered hospital personnel to draw blood 
for evidentiary purposes despite not having a warrant or the actual and voluntary consent of Mr. 
Rios. (R., p. 418.) As it outlined in its Order, the district court based this conclusion on the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing. In support of this conclusion, the district court specifically 
found that Mr. Rios' refusal to sign the blood draw consent form sufiiciently evidenced the absence 
of his actual and voluntary consent. (R., p. 419 .) The district court further determined that Mr. Rios' 
refusal to sign the blood draw consent form could also reasonably be construed as evidencing the 
withdrawal of his statutorily created implied consent under Idaho Code § 18-8002. (R., p. 419.) The 
district court's conclusions are also supported by precedent from this State as outlined above. 
Therefore, the district court did not err when it granted Mr. Rios' motion to suppress because it 
correctly concluded that Mr. Rios did not consent to the warrantless evidentiary blood draw. 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant-Appellee Kyle Nicholas Rios respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the findings of the district court. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 25 
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·~, _i_U~~ day of November, 15. 
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